Conseil pour la réduction des accidents industriels majeurs https://www.craim.ca/en/ La référence en matière de gestion rigoureuse, responsable et concertée des risques liés aux matières dangereuses. Wed, 20 Dec 2023 21:16:03 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.2 New board of directors for the CRAIM https://www.craim.ca/en/nouveauca2024/ Wed, 20 Dec 2023 21:15:14 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3775 Montréal, le 6 décembre 2023 – The Major Industrial Accidents Reduction Council (CRAIM), held its annual general meeting at the Club de Golf Métropolitain Anjou last Wednesday. This was an opportunity for the President, Mr. Dimitri Tsingakis to review the activities of the past year and the present the preliminary plan for 2024.

During his report, he highlighted the various activities that were held, including webinars on modeling and dust-related risks. He also listed CRAIM’s various collaborations with the Ministry of Public Security (MSP). Members were also able to get a glimpse of the events for the coming year. He mentioned that he wished to consolidate the partnership with other partner associations, as was announced with the signature of this agreement on May 2022 between ASCQ, RECO, AQSICQ and CRAIM (Info).

“Despite the economic situation which affects the whole of society, I am very optimistic for the future of our organization. The work to raise community awareness and the benefits of maintaining our efforts in risk management must continue. If we want to maintain the level of security. » underlined the president, Mr. Tsingakis.

During this meeting, certain outgoing members of the board of directors chose not to renew their tenure, wishing to take some free time for themselves. They are Mr. Pierre Drolet, secretary-treasurer of CRAIM and retired from Air Liquide, Mr. Luc Piché, Prudent and Mr. Yves Dubeau. The latter has been active within CRAIM since 1996. He has held various positions on the board of directors, including president, vice-president and administrator. We sincerely thank these three pillars of CRAIM, who have allowed our Association to distinguish itself in the field of major technological risk management.

In return, we welcome with great pleasure four new administrators, namely Ms. Rupa Desai, process and risk management engineer at Tetra Tech QE, Ms. Marion Bizouarn, founder and process safety consultant at SOA Formation et Accompagnement, Mr. Daniel Oligny, president of Prudent and Mr. Raymond Desbordes, general manager – Somavrac Group.

This change within the council will certainly influence the orientations and actions of CRAIM so that they better reflect the needs and aspirations of today.

Renseignements :

Ginette Joly : Ginette.joly@craim.ca

Tel. : 450 665-1525

Télécharger le communiqué (FRENCH) (PDF)

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ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2023 AND CONFERENCE (French) – December 6th, 2023 https://www.craim.ca/en/aga-2020-3/ Wed, 08 Nov 2023 16:24:21 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3730 On Wednesday December 6th 2023, the CRAIM will hold its annual general assembly at the Golf Metropolitain Anjou. All CRAIM members are invited to this meeting which is free of charge.

Following the assembly, we will have a presentation on Ammonia (in french)

  • Conférence sur l’ammoniac, by M. Yves Dubeau and Éric Clément.

This event open to all CRAIM members and partners. The inscription fee for members is 60$ and 85$ for non-members.

Invitation format PDF

Inscription

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SEMINAR – DUST RELATED RISKS https://www.craim.ca/en/beacon-mar-2021-2-2-2-2/ Fri, 03 Nov 2023 13:24:52 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3697 The MIARC will be presenting a seminar (French) on dust related risks.

In french only. 

Nov. 20th 2023, Varennes

More info

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Info CRAIM – sheet #3 https://www.craim.ca/en/info-craim-02-2/ Mon, 25 Sep 2023 18:56:49 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3660 This fact sheet aims to clarify the concept of the safety perimeter used during an emergency response involving hazardous substances and that of the emergency measures planning zones established in the environmental emergency plans required by the Regulation respecting Environmental Emergencies 2019. It illustrates the link between the results of scenario modeling resulting from a risk analysis and the planning of emergency measures. The concepts and recommendations presented in this document apply mainly to fixed installations and are generally not applicable to incidents involving the transport of dangerous substances.

(ENG-FR, PDF)

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FORMAtion RUE – PMU https://www.craim.ca/en/beacon-mar-2021-2-2-2/ Wed, 12 Apr 2023 16:49:13 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3585 Le CRAIM vous offre la possibilité de participer à un atelier sur le Règlement sur les urgences environnementales ainsi que sur les plans d’urgence en relation avec le RUE. Cet événement a pour objectifs de vous faire connaître les obligations auxquelles doit se conformer une installation possédant des substances dangereuses, et de vous informer sur tous les aspects concernant les exigences légales du contenu d’un plan de mesures d’urgence ainsi que les moyens de le rendre plus efficace.

In french only. 

May 26 2023 – Magog QC.

More info

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Webinar – LARGE SCALE EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCh at dnv spadeadam https://www.craim.ca/en/webinar_dnv_spadeadam_2022/ Tue, 01 Nov 2022 15:14:16 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3530 HISTORY AND CONTINUING RELEVANCE

For almost half a century, the Spadeadam (UK) research and test facility has being used to improve our understanding and knowledge of major industrial incidents. On this unique site, full-scale tests can be carried out to help companies assess the consequences on facilities or people, whether during accident investigations (eg Buncefield), during training or tests.

This presentation will highlight the daily work and research that is done, for past decades, and introduce some new prospective areas of research (eg hydrogen).

This event is free.

For more info click here.

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Proccess safety BEACON – JULY 2022 https://www.craim.ca/en/beacon-june-2022-2/ Tue, 05 Jul 2022 20:09:53 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3491 A plant experienced a piping leak and could not shutdown to properly repair it. Using their leak clamp procedure, they consulted the required experts and approved use of a temporary clamp for 6 months. After that time, the status of the clamp was to be reviewed, evaluated and if acceptable, reapproved by the proper people.

Two years later this clamp started to leak. The reevaluations and reapprovals had not taken place and the clamp remained in service for much longer than allowed by the company’s policies and procedures.

A pipe clamp is a temporary solution when proper repairs cannot be made. It is weaker than the original piping. Besides, the underlying problem that led to the first leak is still there. It has to be fixed eventually. Pipe clamps are not meant to be “permanent” solutions.

All temporary changes need to be managed under the company’s Management of Change process. And best practice is to enter a “turnaround” type work order so maintenance can plan to repair/replace the leaking pipe at the next turnaround.

Temporary means Temporary !

Read the July 2022 issue

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CSB Releases New Safety Video Incompatible Chemicals: Explosion at AB Specialty Silicones https://www.craim.ca/en/csb_aghorn_video-2/ Fri, 03 Jun 2022 18:02:12 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3475

Washington D.C., April 28, 2022 – Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released a new safety video on its investigation into a massive explosion and fire that occurred in May of 2019 at the AB Specialty Silicones facility in Waukegan, IL. The incident killed four workers, destroyed the facility, and caused extensive damage to nearby businesses..

The CSB’s new safety video includes an animation of the events leading up to the incident, and interviews with both the CSB’s Chairperson and Lead Investigator.

At AB Specialty Silicones, two incompatible chemicals were mixed during production of an emulsion product. The chemicals reacted and produced flammable hydrogen gas that ignited, causing the fatal explosion.

The incident is one of many investigated by the CSB during the agency’s history that resulted from inadequate recognition and evaluation of reactive chemical hazards. In its report, the agency made recommendations to AB Specialty Silicones and reiterated recommendations to the Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency with the goal of addressing the regulatory gap covering reactive chemicals.

Chairperson Lemos concludes the video by saying, “It is past time for regulators to fully recognize the hazards presented by reactive chemicals. We call on OSHA and EPA to update their regulatory standards to include better coverage of reactive chemicals. Closing the regulatory gap will prevent further tragic incidents and save lives. Together,  we can impact safety for our chemical industries, our workers, our community, and our environment.”

SOURCE CSB

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Proccess safety BEACON – JUNE 2022 https://www.craim.ca/en/beacon-june-2022/ Fri, 03 Jun 2022 17:46:24 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3469 A company decided to stop making a chemical product. One of the input materials was toxic and corrosive phosphorus trichloride (PCl3). The lines to the storage tank and the process area were cleared of PCl3 . A few years later, an operator found a leak outdoors. The investigation found that the leak was coming from the “empty” PCl3 line. No one was injured and the spill was contained.

During the clearing and flushing steps to shut down the PCl3 facility, someone missed clearing or flushing that section of line. It took a while, but the material corroded the “empty” pipe and caused a release.

We think of catastrophic incidents as occurring quickly like an explosion. However, many serious incidents have occurred months or even years after a mistake was made.

An operator may have mistakenly opened the wrong valve, realized the mistake closed it, but never told anyone. Did some material pass through in that short time? What happens or when it will occur is difficult to predict, but it could cause a serious problem.

Or take another example: A maintenance technician is replacing the seal on a pump. T he wrong seal is picked up in the stockroom and installed. When put into service, it may take some more time for the incorrect seal to fail. The incorrect seal will probably fail before the correct one.

An error now may cause a disaster in the future !

Read the June 2022 issue

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Proccess safety BEACON – MAY 2022 https://www.craim.ca/en/beacon-may-2022/ Fri, 03 Jun 2022 17:38:42 +0000 https://www.craim.ca/?p=3463 On May 3, 2019, operators at a plant in Waukegan, Illinois were performing a batch operation, manually adding and mixing chemicals in a tank inside a building. An operator pumped an incorrect chemical into the tank. That chemical was incompatible with a chemical already in the tank. After the chemicals were mixed; they reacted. The tank contents foamed and overflowed from the tank top opening. The reaction produced highly flammable hydrogen gas which was released into the building. The hydrogen ignited, and the explosion destroyed the building, fatally injuring four employees.

The incompatible chemical was stored in a 55 gallon blue plastic drum identical to drums containing the correct chemicals. The only differentiating markings were small labels on the drums and bung caps. The company did not have a written procedure requiring employees to segregate incompatible chemicals in the production building or to remove containers after use. In March 2019, two months before this incident, this company had a near miss involving two chemicals stored in similar 55 gallon blue metal drums. The wrong material was added to a batch from similar drums. To avoid confusion from similar containers, it developed a procedure for 2 people to verify material identity prior to addition.

This company assessed product manufacturing operations using a “Technical Service Request” (TSR), which evaluated business and safety risks. The TSR did not, and was not intended to, assess hazards of process operations or to establish safeguards.

During the incident, workers recognized that a process upset had occurred when the tank overflowed, and a fog formed. However, the workers did not recognize the immediate hydrogen hazard created by the upset which was noted on the Safety Data Sheet (SDS) for the input

Sometimes, we need to think the “unthinkable.”

Read the May 2022 issue

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